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MULTINATIONALS IN HOST COUNTRIES:
CAN THEY BE HELD LIABLE UNDER THE
ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS?
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Fruit Company (UFC), a U.S. multinational
corporation specializing in bananas, orchestrated the 1954
coup in Guatemala because of its fear that the land reform
policies going on in Guatemala at the time could result in the
expropriation of its property.1 In the early 1950s, the banana
company alerted the U.S. news media, in particular the New
York Times publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger and certain
members of Congress, of the alleged infiltration of communists
in .the Guatemalan government.2 Through the expenditure of
over half a million dollars a year on lobbyists and publicists
the UFC successfully infiltrated the United States with red
scare propaganda.3 The Eisenhower Administration finally
gave the green light to the CIA in 1954, ordering a coup in
Guatemala.4
Today, multinational corporations (MNCs) doing business
in countries such as Burma,' Indonesia, China and Nige-
ria-countries whose internal social and political policies are at
1. See generally STEPHEN SCHLESINGER & STEPHEN KINZER, BITTER FRUIT 79-
97 (1983). The UFC had some prior experience in the internal politics of Central
American governments-in 1910, it had organized an armed invasion of Honduras,
run by its hired mercenary, Machine Gun Maloney. See THOMAS DONALDSON, THE
ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 9 (1989).
2. See SCHLESINGER & KINzER, supra note 1, at 83-85.
3. See id. at 97. During the time of land reform in Guatemala, agents of
UFO organized and paid for "choreographed" press tours in Guatemala for U.S.
journalists and presented the Guatemalan government as a Marxist regime. In
1953, one year before the CIA-backed coup, the UFC wrote and circulated a "confi-
dential" newsletter to approximately 250 American journalists on the political and
economic climate in Guatemala. See id at 89-90. Eventually these newsletters
found their way into U.S. newspapers. See id.
4. See id. at 117.
5. When the military dictatorship took over Burma in 1989, it changed its
country's name from Burma to Myanmar. See G. Pascal Zachary, U.S. Companies
Back Out of Burma, Citing Human-Rights Concerns, Graft, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13,
1995, at A10. However, the name Burma is still commonly used by dissidents and
outsiders.
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odds with those of the United States-are on the defensive.' If
an MNC is doing business in a well-publicized, non-democratic
dictatorship accused of perpetrating human rights violations,
such as Burma, the MNC must justify its presence. MNCs
usually handle this attack by arguing that their presence in
hostile countries encourages those countries to embrace democ-
racy. For example, MNCs such as Unocal and Texaco claim
that by doing business in Burma they are providing an alter-
native to dictatorship, a model of democracy and that divesting
will only isolate the country and prolong the control of military
dictatorship.' This defense contradicts the position that their
presence sustains the Burmese military dictatorship, and ac-
cordingly, they argue that it is their corporate responsibility to
remain in Burma, not to divest.'
MNCs first recognized the importance of corporate respon-
sibility when they were threatened with boycotts in the 1970s,
during the campaign to end apartheid in South Africa.9 Corpo-
rate responsibility advocates who came from within the indus-
try imposed codes of conduct on themselves when they were
doing business in a well-known rogue country, so as to pre-
empt the impending call for divestiture." Today, these self-
imposed codes and other external voluntary codes conform to
the international community's own uniform reaction to dis-
agreeable countries, such as Burma, and are only referred to
when the international community has agreed to condemn a
government to isolation." Only then are MNCs forced to justi-
fy their presence and possibly self-impose codes. When the
international community is not consistently reminded of a
6. While the U.S. government and its citizens have been educated on the
internal policies of these countries by a different method than they had been
about Guatemala, the final view of the policies of these countries and of Guatema-
la is that they are antithetical to the policies of the United States.
7. See Zachary, supra note 5; The Burma Freedom and Democracy Act of
1995: Hearings on S. 1511 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 76-80 (1996) [hereinafter Burma Hearings]. Unocal
claims that by laying down a gas pipeline in the Karen and Mon States of Bur-
ma, the people in the vicinity will prosper because of the attendant improved
standard of living. See Zachary, supra note 5.
8. See Zachary, supra note 5; Burma Hearings, supra note 7, at 76-80.
9. See Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revo-
lution?, 19 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 1963, 1970-1971 (1996).
10. See id.
11. Cf DONALDSON, supra note 1, at 23-24 (describing the motivations of orga-
nizations involved in international affairs in terms of the "Prisoner's Dilemma.").
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rogue government, or when it is not in agreement regarding
how to handle such governments, the focus on the role of an
MNC in such a country is at a low and pressure to self-impose
is slight.12 When the economic policies of Western countries
override an international response to human rights violations
and the international community continues to do business with
disagreeable countries, MNCs and the international communi-
ty have no incentive to self-impose or adhere to externally
imposed codes. As a result, MNCs accused of propping up ob-
scure dictatorships, or violating human rights along with an
unsensationalized dictatorship, are basically immune." These
arbitrary corporate codes are only utilized when a relatively
uniform voice within the international community speaks out
against an insupportable dictatorship.'4 Only then is an
MNC's role in such a country reviewed; a review that has no
legally-binding force because an MNC is not legally account-
able to any system, 5 except for that of the host country. 6
Consequently, the international community has neglected its
responsibility to respond to human rights violations. By allow-
ing an arbitrary system of compliance to be the sole structure
in controlling MNCs, the international community has signaled
that MNCs should not be held responsible for their direct and
indirect violations of human rights.
This Note argues that when an MNC acts in collusion with
a government in violating human rights, the MNC must be
held liable for these human rights violations. Part II discusses




15. Under traditional concepts of international law MNCs are not accountable
for human rights violations because they are not sovereign states. Cf. J.L.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 1 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) (describ-
ing international law as a "body of rules and principles of action which are bind-
ing upon civilized states in their relations with one another."). One exception to
this rule would be if the human rights violations were perpetrated in the pursuit
of genocide. See Convention om the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. IV, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 [hereinafter Genocide Con-
vention].
16. Most host countries certainly have the legal capacity to bring charges or
allow civil suits against an MNC, but often this is not a viable choice when a
government is colluding with the MNC in violation of human rights, or when it is
sanctioning the activities of the MNC.
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community has relied on thus far and the limitations of this
system. Part IIH argues that a move toward holding MNCs
liable for such violations must be made and that the Alien Tort
Claims Act"' (ATCA) is one method that can be used to hold
MNCs liable under international law. 8 Part III also examines
some of the obstacles in holding an MNC liable under interna-
tional law, which has historically held states exclusively re-
sponsible for illegal acts, but not private actors. Part IV consid-
ers Shell Oil's activities in Nigeria, where Shell Oil has been
accused of assisting the Nigerian government in its violation of
its citizens' human rights, as a case study in applying the
ATCA to a private actor. Part V concludes by arguing in favor
of holding MNCs accountable for human rights violations and
discusses how the Alien Tort Claims Act is an avenue toward
breaking down the political shield protecting MNCs from scru-
tiny.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF, AND DIFFICULTIES IN, HOLDING
MNCs LIABLE
"ITihere is one and only one social responsibility of busi-
ness-to increase its... profits." 9 This view, held by many
economists and business supporters, reveals the heart of the
problem in holding MNCs responsible for their activities in
host countries. An example of the antagonism toward control-
ling business occurred in 1977, when the United States passed
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,2" barring U.S. corporations
from bribing foreign government officials.2 ' U.S. corporations
resented this impediment to their competitive edge over other
countries, particularly former West Germany, Japan and Eng-
land, who did not have internal laws barring bribery.22 The
U.S. corporations claimed that if MNCs were to be regulated in
this manner, an international response would be necessaryY
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
18. The Alien Tort Claims Act also is referred to as the Alien Tort Act and
the Alien Tort Statute. For consistency purposes, this Note will use its current,
formal title: Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).
19. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962).
20. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1994)).
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This example, while not relevant when an MNC is accused of
violating human rights law, is relevant to an understanding of
the political and economic climate that opposes any regulation
of MNCs.
"The multinational corporation has been defined as 'a
national company in two or more countries operating in associ-
ation, with one controlling the other in whole or in part."
Modern MNCs, a post-World War II product, have been suc-
cessful for a variety reasons, including lower labor costs in de-
veloping countries.25 MNCs find developing countries desir-
able because they provide the most efficient production in
today's market. 6 Production in developing countries is more
efficient today in part because many developing countries do
not maintain the same environmental and labor standards that
are found in the countries of MNC headquarters. As of yet,
the MNCs are not required to follow any international or
home 8 standards for the treatment of the environment and
their employees. Instead, they are only required to comply with
the laws and standards of the host country. Given that these
standards often do not conform with international standards
for labor or the environment,"° or when they do conform, they
are not enforced, the MNC is attracted to the developing coun-
try, where costs are low.3 Competitive host countries do not
24. DONALDSON, supra note 1, at 30.
25. See id. Donaldson notes that the success of MNCs is also attributable to
the "increasing importance of economies of scale in manufacturing, improved com-
munication and transportation systems, and rising worldwide consumer demand for
new products." Id.
26. See LOUIS TURNER, MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD
175-176 (1973) ("Classical economic theorists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo
put forward the theory that, under free trade, geographical specialization will
permit production to occur where it can be carried out most efficiently.").
27. See DONALDSON, supra note 1, at 95-98. There is much debate on whether
MNCs should conform to the environmental and labor standards of its home coun-
try. For example, the argument that salaries in a host country should be equal to
salaries in the home country for comparable work (adjusting for standards of liv-
ing) eliminates the role of the international market in establishing salary levels.
See id. at 98.
28. "Home" refers to the MNCs' place of incorporation, distinguished from
"host," a country where an MNC has its business.
29. See DONALDSON, supra note 1, at 95-101.
30. See Genevieve Mullett, Note, ISO 1400: Harmonizing Environmental Stan-
dards and Certification Procedures Worldwide, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 379, 396-
97 (1997).
31. See generally Judith Kimerling, The Environmental Audit of Texaco's Ama-
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want to enact or enforce environmental or labor laws because
MNCs will not find the host country as economically desir-
able. 2 This is particularly true with host countries that have
partially nationalized their industries, because the host coun-
try economically benefits from an MNC whose costs are low
and profits are high.33 When an MNC and a host country are
in a partnership, neither side has an incentive to increase costs
of production. Further, the failure on the part of MNCs and
host countries to embrace higher standards in production has
not been challenged by the international community, but in-
stead has provided only a loose framework of aspirational
corporate codes. This framework is the only set of principles
and goals guiding the decision-making process of an MNC
which endeavors to invest globally.
A. International Attempts to Control MNCs
In the late 1950s, the only concern over MNCs conducting
business in host countries was expressed by developed coun-
tries interested in an international standard for the treatment
and protection of foreign investment. 4 In 1976, the Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) es-
tablished an international standard for the protection of for-
zon Oil Fields: Environmental Justice or Business As Usual?, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 199 (1994). An example of an MNC violating the environmental standards of
both the international community and a host country can be found in Texaco's
activities in Ecuador, which ceased as recently as 1992. See id. at 199-208. Even
though Ecuador had respectable environmental laws on the books, the government
did not enforce them because it would have been politically unpopular. See id. at
207-08.
32. A comparison to the position of host country governments is the position
of U.S. corporations after the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed-both
parties want to be able to compete with entities that are not subject to strict
regulation. If one host country enacts or enforces its environmental and labor
laws, the MNC will find another host country which does not.
33. See Brooke Clagett, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens In International
Environmental Tort Suits: Closing the Doors of the U.S. Courts to Foreign Plain-
tiffs, 9 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 513, 522 (1996) ("U.S. multinational corporations will
continue to injure the environment in developing countries whose needs for foreign
investment appear greater than their interest in preserving a healthy natural
environment for their own citizens."); see also Thomas M. Kerr, What's Good for
General Motors is Not Always Good for Developing Nations: Standardizing Environ-
mental Assessment of Foreign-Investment Projects in Developing Countries, 29 INT'L
LAW. 153, 162 (1995).
34. See The United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, at
4, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.AJ4 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 UNCTC].
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eign investment.3 5 Departing from the purely foreign invest-
ment perspective, 5 these guidelines promoted cooperation
between the host government and the MNC by introducing a
labor standard for MNCs and by presenting the goal of having
MNCs respect the economic policies of developing countries.
In the Commentary of the guidelines, the OECD stresses the
importance of MNCs refraining "from any improper involve-
ment in local political activities," and expresses the general
expectation that business in host countries remain separate
from politics. 38 The International Labor Organization (ILO)
adopted similar codes in 1977 specifically focusing on workers'
rights in employment. 39 The 1970s movement towards creat-
ing a framework that protected both host countries and MNCs
carried over into the 1980s and, in 1990, resulted in the most
recent international code of conduct, the United Nations Code
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC).4" Like
its predecessors, UNCTC established standards for the treat-
ment of MNCs by host countries, while also creating standards
for MNC conduct.4' Developing countries wanted a mandatory
or legally binding code, but the developed countries preferred,
and won, a voluntary code.42 Therefore, UNCTC laid down
aspirational codes, such as, "transnational corporations shall
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms," and non-
interference in internal political affairs." These codes presup-
35. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Declaration
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, June 21, 1976, Annex
on Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 15 I.L.M. 967, 969-77 [hereinafter
OECD Guidelines].
36. This perspective was reflected in early attempts to protect investment
through the creation of dispute-settlement mechanisms and insurance coverage for
non-commercial risk. See 1988 UNCTC, supra note 34, at 4.
37. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 35, 15 I.L.M. at 972, 976-77 (Guidelines
regarding "General Policies" and "Employment and Industrial Relations.").
38. Id. at 972. These policies have a double-edged sword effect: they target
the MNC that colludes with a dictatorship in violation of human rights while also
targeting the MNC who speaks out against a dictatorship. Advocates of universal
corporate responsibility want to target the first type of MNC and not the latter.
39. See generally International Labor Organization: Tripartite Declaration of
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, Nov. 16, 1977,
17 I.L.M. 422, 422-31 [hereinafter ILO Declaration].
40. Development and International Economic Co-operation: Transnational Cor-
porations, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990) [hereinafter UNCTC].
41. See id. at 6.
42. See 1988 UNCTC, supra note 34, at 26; UNCTC, supra note 40, at 1.
43. UNCTC, supra note 40, at 7-8.
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pose an antagonistic relationship between the MNC and the
government of the host country and, therefore, they only pro-
tect the host country from MNCs like the UFC. However, for
those governments who condone the activities of its MNCs,
these protective codes lose their purpose.
B. U.S. Adoption of Model Business Principles
During the 1980s and 1990s, human rights organizations
lobbied the U.S. government to alter its trade policies with
China because of China's human rights record." These orga-
nizations have proposed that the United States withhold
China's most-favored nation status (MFN) if China continues
to refuse to make changes in the area of human rights.45
While the trade relations between the United States and Chi-
na have never resulted in a denial of the MFN status, each
Administration has felt pressure to offer a substitute to an all-
out human-rights linkage to trade.46 Most recently, in May
1995, the Clinton Administration adopted a set of principles
named the Model Business Principles as a substitute for a
human rights-linkage to trade with China.47 The Model Prin-
ciples address U.S. MNCs doing business globally and refer to
conduct involving forced labor, child labor, labor organizing
and bargaining, non-discrimination and worker health and
safety.48 By issuing the voluntary Model Principles, the
Clinton Administration not only protected an MNC's choice to
adopt the Model Principles, but it also shielded MNCs from the
threat of government monitoring and enforcement.49 Not only
are the Model Principles voluntary and unenforceable," but
the U.S. Department of Commerce, which is responsible for
44. See Diane F. Orentlicher & Timothy A. Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors:
The Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in China, NW. J. INT'L L. &
BUS. 66, 71-72 (1993).
45. See id. at 75-76.
46. See id. at 82 (A proposed code-of-conduct specific to business operations in
China "asks companies with a significant presence in China to adhere to a set of
basic human rights principles.").
47. See Voluntary "Model Business Principles" Issued By the Clinton Admin-
istration May 26, 1995, DAiLY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) (May 31, 1995), avail-
able in LEXIS, Exec Library, Drexel File [hereinafter Model Principles]; see also
Cassel, supra note 9, at 1974.
48. See Model Principles, supra note 47, paras. 1-2.
49. See Cassel, supra note 9, at 1974.
50. See Model Principles, supra note 47, pmbl.
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implementation of the codes, has failed to monitor the MNCs'
implementation of the Model Principles.5 The failure on the
part of the Commerce Department may be attributable to the
lack of support for the Model Principles from both human
rights and business groups. 2 Human rights groups consider
the Model Principles as being both ineffectual and vague, and
thus, unable to target human rights violations. 3 Business
groups argued for a multilateral approach to corporate conduct
in host countries so as to protect U.S. companies from an eco-
nomic competitive disadvantage that may accompany the adop-
tion of the Model Principles.' With or without the support of
these groups, the Model Principles still fall short of any com-
prehensive mandatory code targeting human rights violations.
C. Self-Regulation by MNCs
The concept of self-imposed corporate responsibility first
developed in the 1970s and 1980s as a response to the move-
ment to end apartheid in South Africa through divestiture. 5
In an attempt to fashion a publicly acceptable alternative to
divestiture, Reverend Leon Sullivan, a General Motors board
member, developed a set of principles for MNCs doing business
in South Africa." The Sullivan Principles demanded corporate
responsibility on the part of MNCs by conforming to certain
standards in South Africa: (1) commitment to racially non-
discriminatory employment facilities; 7 (2) paying fair wages
well above the minimum cost of living;" (3) increasing the
number of blacks and other non-whites in managerial posi-
tions; 9 and most notably and controversially, (4) the use of
corporate influence to help improve the plight of black employ-
51. See Cassel, supra note 9, at 1975.
52. See id. at 1974-75.
53. See id.
54. See U.S. Council Comments on Business Principles, BUS. WIRE, Apr. 5,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The United States Council
for International Business favors the OECD and ILO multilateral guidelines. See
Cassel, supra note 9, at 1975.
55. See Cassel, supra note 9, at 1970-71.
56. See Sullivan Principles For U.S. Corporations Operating in South Africa,
Nov. 8, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 1496 [hereinafter Sullivan Principles]; see also Cassel,
supra note 9, at 1970-71.
57. See Sullivan Principles, supra note 56, Principle II, 24 I.L.M. 1496.
58. See id. Principle III, 24 I.L.M. 1487.
59. See id. Principle V, 24 I.L.M. 1498.
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ees outside of the workplace and to help put an end to South
Africa's apartheid system.6" Each MNC adopting the Sullivan
Principles agreed to outside audits and public reports as a way
of ensuring compliance.6' In 1977, when the Sullivan Princi-
ples were created, only twelve U.S. MNCs adopted them, but
by 1986, 200 of the 260 U.S. MNCs doing business in South
Africa had adopted the Sullivan Principles.62 This commend-
able attempt to pacify those calling for divestiture lasted until
the mid-1980s when the failure of the Sullivan Principles to
end apartheid became apparent.63 However, the underlying
principles of the model survived and many other attempts have
been made by MNCs to self-regulate."
Northern Ireland is one country that has experimented
with a corporate code. Still in existence today, the MacBride
Principles were developed in the mid-1980s.65 While the
MacBride Principles are limited in scope compared with the
Sullivan Principles, one Principle demands that MNCs be
responsible for the personal safety of workers, not only at the
place of employment, but also while traveling to and from
work.66 Other examples of countries that have been targeted
for corporate codes of conduct are China and the former Soviet
Union. 7 When the former Soviet Union dissolved, support for
these corporate codes dissolved too, revealing the ephemeral
nature of corporate codes. 68 Even taken together, these codes
of conduct have a minimal impact on the operation of an MNC,
or on its decision to invest in a country of its choice. Further-
more, these codes fail to compel MNCs to conduct business in a
60. See id. Principle VI, 24 I.L.M. 1498. This Principle was and is controver-
sial because corporate codes generally do not promote MNCs' involvement in the
political structure of a host country. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 35, 15
I.L.M. at 972; UNCTC, supra note 40, at 8.
61. See Cassel, supra note 9, at 1971; Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-
Darricarr~re, Enforcing International Labor Rights Through Corporate Codes of
Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 666 (1995).
62.' See Cassel, supra note 9, at 1970.
63. See id. at 1971. The Sullivan Principles were ineffectual in bringing any
significant change to the apartheid system because they alone were not incentive
enough for the South African government to turn over power. See id.
64. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrbre, supra note 61, at 671-74.
65. See Sean MacBride, The MacBride Principles (Irish National Caucus,
Wash., D.C. 1984).
66. See id. art. 2.
67. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrbre, supra note 61, at 672-73.
68. See id.
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manner that is acceptable to the host country's government
and, when the host country's standards are substandard, in a
manner that is acceptable to the international community.
Without a tradition of oversight, MNCs may engage in
conduct that is, at best, a violation of workers' rights and, at
worst, a violation of human rights.69 If an MNC has no ac-
countability (other than to its own economic well-being), there
will be no way to require an MNC to comply with other inter-
national standards, such as human rights standards. MNCs
are sheltered by the voluntary and unenforceable nature of
corporate codes of conduct and by the lack of an international
body with the necessary jurisdiction to hear claims against
them for alleged violations of human rights. For now, MNCs
are protected against any mandatory enforcement of corporate
codes and can continue to enjoy minimal environment and
labor standards. In the worst case scenarios, MNCs are free
from taking legal responsibility for human rights violations
when a host country chooses to do nothing.
III. ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. History
The ATCA provides one possible solution to the present-
day inability to hold an MNC accountable for human rights
violations.7" While the ATCA does not reach violations of
workers' rights, it does reach environmental violations."' By
starting with the most egregious acts-human rights viola-
tions-the international community can slowly adapt to hold-
ing MNCs responsible for their activities in host countries. If
the ATCA finds an MNC liable, it not only will be providing a
civil remedy for victims of human rights violations, but the
ATCA will be promoting a restructuring of the statist para-
digm of international law.
The ATCA evolved from Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of
69. Some people would argue that workers' rights are human rights. For the
purposes of this Note, workers' rights refer to the right to organize unions and be
paid a living wage. Human rights include the right to be free from torture.
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
71. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 850 F: Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The ATCA
does not reach violations of workers' rights because the plaintiff must show that a
tort has been committed for ATCA purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
937
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178972 and, in its current form, gives "[tihe district courts ...
original jurisdiction [over] any civil action by an alien for a
tort... committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States."73 While legislative history is scarce on
the purpose of the ATCA,74 one purpose was to provide a rem-
edy in U.S. courts for aliens who were mistreated on U.S.
soil. 75 The ATCA was to be applied when foreign affairs were
implicated and U.S. interests were at stake.76 In the early
years of the ATCA, the assumption was that foreign affairs
would only be implicated when tortious conduct occurred in the
United States.7 However, the ATCA was rarely invoked and
claims were rarely seen in federal courts throughout the 19th
century and the first part of the 20th century.78
While an ATCA claim was finally upheld in the 1961 case
of Adra v. Clift79, the courts generally remained hesitant to
uphold claims under the statute.0 This hesitancy was due, in
part, to the vague definition of customary law8 and to the
72. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77; see also Charles F.
Marshall, Note, Re-framing the Alien Tort Act After Kadic v. Karadzic, 21 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 591, 597 (1995).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Under the ATCA, two possible violations that could
occur are of a U.S. treaty or customary law, i.e., the law of nations. See id. For
the purposes of the violation of customary law, this Note will use the current
usage "customary law."
74. See Marshall, supra note 72, at 597-98.
75. See id. at 598-99.
76. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan-Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring) ("There is evidence . . . that the intent of this section
was to assure aliens access to federal courts to vindicate any incident which, if
mishandled by a state court, might blossom into an international crisis.").
77. See William R. Castro, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over
Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 484
(1986).
78. See Marshall, supra note 72, at 599.
79. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D. Md. 1961) (involving a Lebanese
plaintiff who sued his former wife and her husband for custody of their child).
80. See, e.g., Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1976) (reject-
ing the argument that the wrongful confiscation of property in Nazi Germany
violated "law of nations" so as to give rise to claim under the ATCA); ITT v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (rejecting the argument that
alleged conversion was in violation of the "law of nations" for purposes of the
ATCA).
81. Customary law, as defined by the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, is an "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law." Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(b), 59
Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. To prove that
there is a customary law, a party
938
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lack of agreement on what conduct fell within customary
law. 2 Since the ATCA was enacted, customary law has not
only evolved into a different body of law, it has also become a
part of the law of the United States.' A court deciding an
ATCA claim would need to be confident that the customary law
claimed to have been violated was in fact a custom and that
any court hearing the claim would agree.
B. Expansion of the Alien Tort Claims Act
In 1980, the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala'
held that an alien may bring a tort claim against a foreign
defendant under the ATCA for a violation of customary law
that did not occur on U.S. soil, did not implicate U.S. foreign
affairs, but instead, involved another country's treatment of its
own citizens.85 The failure on the part of prior courts to find a
violation of -customary law,86 was not a problem for the
Filartiga court who, by relying on The Paquette Habana,"7
interpreted customary law as it exists today and not in
must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has
become binding on the other Party . . . that the rule invoked . . . is in
accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in
question, and that this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to
the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the territorial State.
Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276 (Nov. 20).
82. See, e.g., Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 30 ("[tlhere has been little judicial interpre-
tation of what constitutes the law of nations and no universally accepted definition
of this phrase."); ITT, 519 F.2d at 1015 (discussing the lack of precedent interpret-
ing the ATCA, especially with respect to the term "law of nations."). The courts
generally rely on customary law rather than treaty law in ATCA claims because
most human rights claims are based on custom and not on treaty.
83. The Supreme Court made it clear that customary international law is a
part of U.S. law in The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The Court
went on to state that:
For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs
and usages of civilized nations; and as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators .... Such works are resorted to by judicial
tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the
law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
Id.
84. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
85. See id. at 876-77. Filartiga involved a Paraguayan citizen whose brother
had been tortured to death by a Paraguayan public official acting under color of
law. See id.
86. See, e.g., Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 30-31; ITT, 519 F.2d at 1015.
87. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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1789.88 The Supreme Court had long established that a court
can ascertain the status of customary international law by
"consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public
law; or... the general usage and practice of nations; or...
judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law." 9 There-
fore, the Filartiga court looked to whether the conduct com-
plained of, torture, was a violation of customary law in 1980
and, based on numerous international declarations" against
torture committed under color of law, the Filartiga court con-
cluded that torture did violate customary law.9' It is impor-
tant to note that this finding did not narrow the violations
recognized by the ATCA to acts similar to torture, but rather
"open[ed] the federal courts for adjudication of the rights al-
ready recognized by international law."
92
C. The Rise and Fall of the State Actor Requirement
A state actor requirement inadvertently evolved from the
Filartiga decision. The court concluded that the substantive,
customary law condemned torture only when the actor is act-
88. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
89. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820). Underlying
the court's decision appeared to be sentiment for asserting jurisdiction in the Unit-
ed States because the courts in Paraguay were unable to hear the claim: "Dr.
Filartiga commenced a criminal action in the Paraguayan courts against Pena and
the police for the murder of his son. As a result, Dr. Filartiga's attorney was
arrested and brought to police headquarters where, shackled to a wall, Pena
threatened him with death. This attorney, it is alleged, has since been disbarred
without just cause." Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. The court seemed to make an
underlying argument, albeit not legal, that because this claim could not be heard
in Paraguay and, since both the plaintiffs and defendants had moved to the Unit-
ed States, the claim should be heard in the United States. The policy behind this
argument is similar to the policy behind denying a forum non conveniens motion.
90. Declarations, which also are referred to as Resolutions, are non-binding
laws adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCI-
PLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (3d ed. 1979). While these laws are not
binding on member states, "when they are concerned with general norms or inter-
national law, then acceptance by a majority vote constitutes evidence of the opin-
ions of governments in the widest forum for the expression of such opinions." Id.
91. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881-82.
92. Id. at 887. The Filartiga court held that it is proper to assert jurisdiction
over a claim where acts occurred outside its jurisdiction as long as the act com-
mitted was unlawful where performed. See id. at 885. In an expression of comity,
the court was willing to hear a claim in its own jurisdiction even though the
wrong was committed in another jurisdiction. See id. at 885. Even though the
torture was state-sanctioned by the Paraguayan dictatorship, the acts were still in
violation of Paraguayan law. See id. at 880, 885.
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ing under color of law." The court held that when a state ac-
tor commits torture, customary law is violated; the court did
not hold that the ATCA does not reach private action.94
Whether the ATCA reaches private action was not reviewed
until the court in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic95 held
that a general state actor requirement barred the plaintiffs
from recovering and concluded that established international
law was statist and had not been extended to hold non-state
actors liable as of 1984.96 While acknowledging the finding by
some commentators that individual non-state actors can violate
international law, the court was not convinced that this was
the general consensus.97
Even though the court in Tel-Oren found it difficult to
assert jurisdiction over private actors, other courts have not
been as wary.98 Most notable is the recent Second Circuit de-
cision, involving Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzi6, which
held that certain violations of customary law hold private ac-
tors, as well as state actors, liable for genocide and war
crimes.9 9 In Kadic v. Karadii6,"° the court distinguished
93. See id. at 880.
94. See id.
95. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). The plaintiffs in Tel-Oren were survivors and represen-
tatives of decedents who were killed during a PLO terrorist attack on a civilian
bus in Israel where 22 adults and 12 children were killed and 73 adults and 14
children were seriously injured. See id. at 776. The court held that jurisdiction
could not be asserted over the PLO based on the ATCA See id. at 775. The three
opinions for this decision were written by Justices Edwards, Bork and Robb. For
the purposes of this Note, the opinion of Justice Edwards is referred to as the
opinion of the court.
96. See id. at 792-95.
97. See id. The next year, in Sanchez-Espinoza u. Reagan, the D.C. Circuit
followed Justice Edward's opinion in Tel-Oren when Nicaraguan plaintiffs brought
an action against the Nicaraguan Contra Forces, stating that the ATCA did "not
reach private, non-state conduct of this sort" leaving the possibility of other private
conduct reachable under the ATCA. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202,
206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113-14
(5th Cir. 1988) (court stated in dicta that a private actor can be held liable when
it aids and abets an official in torture); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527
(VLB), 1994 WL 142006, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994) (jurisdiction over MNC for
acts committed on foreign soil are proper when steps taken in the United States
are an integral part of the commissioned acts); Ada v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857,
862-65 (D. Md. 1961) (finding jurisdiction where foreign mother kidnapped baby
with the use of an illegal passport).
99. See Kadic v. Karadri6, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74
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genocide and war crimes from "other instances of inflicting
death, torture, and degrading treatment" in determining
whether the state actor requirement was necessary for each of
these acts.'' After reviewing numerous treaties and declara-
tions, the court held that for both genocide and war crimes, a
non-state individual actor should be held liable. 10 2
When the court reviewed "other instances of inflicting
death, torture, and degrading treatment," which were not com-
mitted in the pursuit of genocide or war crimes, it did not find
any treaties or declarations condemning these acts when com-
mitted by private actors.' 3 The current state of international
substantive law on death, torture or degrading treatment not
F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996). The petition for a rehearing was based on a law review
article arguing that the only violations of law that should be considered by a court
was the one category Congress intended to confer federal jurisdiction over. tort
committed by crews of vessels when boarding ships believed to be aiding the ene-
my. See Kadic v. KaradiiM, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996). However, the court rejected
this analysis based on Filartiga and Congress codified Filartiga in 1991 with the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1994)). See id. at 378. The court, in the first Kadic
opinion, chronicles the history of finding jurisdiction over non-state actors begin-
ning with the prohibition against piracy and extending to the slave trade and
some war crimes. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. The court cites a Supreme Court
decision from 1844 which characterized pirates as "hostis humani generis".-an
enemy of all mankind-in part because they acted "without ... any pretense of
public authority.'" Id. (quoting The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232
(1844)). Therefore, the court followed Filartiga by concluding that customary law
should be construed based on the body of law today, not in 1789. See Kadic, 70
F.3d at 238-39.
100. 70 F.3d at 232.
101. See id. at 241. The court looked to a 1989 Second Circuit decision to de-
termine when state action was required: "evolving standards of international law
govern who is within the [ATCA's] jurisdictional grant.'" Id. (quoting Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 1987)).
102. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241-43. For example, in 1946 when the General As-
sembly of the United Nations declared that genocide was a crime in violation of
international law, the Resolution expressly included private actors as potential
perpetrators. See G.A. Res. 96, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th mtg., at 175-76, U.N.
Doc. AI64IAdd.1 (1946); see also Genocide Convention, supra note 15, art. IV ("Per-
sons committing genocide . . . shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.").
103. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243-44. Some modern commentators have argued
that private individuals have duties under international law while others concede
that there is a long way to go before individual private actors can be held liable
under a treaty or customary law. See Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right:
Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51, 51-53 (1992);
Ian Brownlie, The Place of the Individual in International Law, 50 VA. L. REV.
435, 459-60 (1964).
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in the pursuit of war crimes or genocide, only holds state ac-
tors liable for these acts. 1"4 The court therefore concluded
that torture and summary execution could be actionable under
the ATCA in two scenarios: if the conduct occurred in the
course of the commission of genocide and war crimes; and if
the acts were committed by a state actor not in the course of
the commission of genocide and war crimes. °5 When the acts
complained of were not in the process of committing genocide
or war crimes, a defendant may be a state actor in two scenari-
os.' First, a defendant could qualify as a state, or agent of
the state, according to the definitions of international law.' 7
Second, a defendant who acts in concert with a foreign state
may qualify as a state actor because he is deemed to be acting
under color of law.'08 In this latter example, the court held
that the "color of law" jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C. § 1983'09
was a relevant guide in finding state action by a private ac-
tor."0 The court, however, did not explain how municipal
law"'-42 U.S.C. § 1983 jurisprudence-could be used by
104. See Kadic, 70 F.3d 243-44.
105. See id. at 244.
106. See id. at 244-45.
107. See id. The definition of a state under international law is "an entity
which has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its
own government, and which engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal
relations with other such entities." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1986). For purposes of this Note, this
part of the opinion is not relevant because an MNC would not fall within this
definition.
108. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) states that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subject-
ed, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress.
Id.
110. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245. In Kadic, the court stated that the appellants
were allowed to prove that Karad.i6 acted in concert with Yugoslav officials or
with Yugoslavian aid. See id. When international law determines that the violation
requires state action, then a court may use § 1983 jurisprudence as a guide in
determining when a non-state actor, like Karad.i6, has acted under color of law.
See id.
111. For the purposes of this argument, the Note will use municipal law when
referring to domestic law.
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international law. The curious result of this holding is that a
foreign defendant's liability for a violation of international law
could hinge on the application of municipal law. However,
international law does, to some extent, incorporate concepts
that exist in municipal law, in thd context of general principles
of international law. Based on this connection between interna-
tional law and municipal law, a private actor who is not liable
under a treaty or customary law, could be found liable under a
general principle of law which finds its origins in municipal
law.
This borrowing from U.S. jurisprudence cannot be taken
too lightly because, in order to adopt this jurisprudence, a
court must reassess whether private actors shall be held ac-
countable under international law. If Section 1983 jurispru-
dence can be used by analogy to hold private actors liable for
death, torture or degrading treatment, it will be circumventing
treaty and custom based international law, and instead relying
on general principles of law. By characterizing private action
as state action, judges could conceivably expand which entities
are to be held accountable under international law, albeit,
through a semantic back door. Thus, an MNC, who colludes
with a host country in violation of human rights law may be
behaving like a state actor. If it is, the MNC should be treated
as a state actor under international law. However, before this
recharacterization of state action under international law can
occur, a judge must first decide whether it is appropriate for
international law to adopt Section 1983 jurisprudence as a
general principle of law. If it is appropriate, the question be-
comes: How exactly should Section 1983 jurisprudence be
adopted?
D. General Principles of Law
"General principles of law recognized by civilized nations"
is the third source of international law under Article 38(1)(c) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Stat-
ute)." This source of law was originally included in the pre-
112. See 1CJ Statute, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(c), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3
Bevans 1179, 1187. The first, second and fourth sources of international law are:
first, "international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;" second, "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law;" and fourth "judicial decisions and
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decessor to the ICJ Statute, the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ Statute),"' in order to
allow judges the room necessary to develop international
law." Another purpose in adding this source of law was to
fill gaps left in international law by treaties, customary law
and judicial decisions, where these sources of law would some-
times be insufficient for the making of a determination."5 By
allowing courts to invoke general principles of law, the drafts-
men of the PCIJ Statute:
enabled the Court to replenish, without subterfuge, the rules
of international law by principles tested within the shelter of
more mature and closely integrated legal systems.
They opened a new channel through which concepts of
natural law could be received into international law.
They held out to other international judicial institutions
a tempting set of rules which these might be encouraged to
adopt, as a last resort, in their own practice.
They made it possible for the World Court to strike out a
bolder line in its application of international law than, in the
absence of such wide reserve powers, the Court might have
found it possible to take ....
Finally, they threw out a challenge to the Doctrine of
International Law to sail into new and uncharted seas."6
General principles of law ideally would take over when the
other sources of law failed to solve a legal dispute, however:
[n]o decision of the [ICJI, or indeed the [PCIJI, has yet been
based explicitly upon a principle or rule of law drawn from
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." Id. art. 38(1)(a), (b), (d).
113. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Dec. 16, 1920, 6
L.N.T.S. 390.
114. See BROWNLIE, supra note 90, at 15-16.
115. See Christopher A. Ford, Judicial Discretion in International Jurispru-
dence: Article 38(1)() and "General Principles of Law", 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 35, 63 (1994). In 1920, when the Statute of the PCIJ was drafted, the practice
of invoking general principles of law was already established. See id. at 63. Article
38 carried over general principles of law from the Statute of the/PCIJ in order to
prevent the phenomenon of non liquet decisions. See id. at 64. In Roman courts
when a judge concluded that a case had not been made clear for him, he had the
right to sign the opinion N.L., the abbreviated form of the phrase "non liquet," i.e.
it is not clear. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1055 (6th ed. 1990).
116. Georg Schwarzenberger, Forward to BiN CHENG, GENERAL PRINcIPLEs OF
LAW xi (1987).
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the 'general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations'.... Even where referred to by a party to proceed-
ings, the general principles tend to be employed as something
of a makeweight or last resort, a supplementary argument in
case the contentions based on customary law or treaties fail
to convince; with the result that the Court hardly if ever
needs to refer to them .... 117
Part of the problem of basing a legal theory on general princi-
ples of law is that there is no clear understanding of how to
define "general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions.""' One of the drafters of the PCIJ Statute, the Belgian
jurist, Baron Descamps, likened general principles of law to
natural law."' However, other drafters feared this natural
law interpretation would allow judges to rely too heavily on
their subjective views as to what was "just" and reworked the
phrasing so judges could look to municipal laws for guidance,
while still being afforded the room necessary to develop inter-
national law.2 ° In response to the confusion around the pur-
pose of article 38(1)(c), two schools of thought developed,
comparativist and categoricist, each explaining not only how to
discern what a "general principle of law recognized by civilized
nations" is but also what method should be used to make this
determination.' Due to certain weaknesses in both of these
approaches, a merger has occurred where principles from both
schools of thought are being used to assess potential general
117. Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Jus-
tice 1960-1989, 1990 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 110-11.
118. ICJ Statute, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(c), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans
1179, 1187. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Judge Ammoun took issue
with the European relic, "civilized nations," as the locator of general principles.
See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 4,
132-40 (Feb. 20) (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun). Thirlway has responded to
Judge Ammoun's opinion with the explanation that the term "civilized nations" is
used to "limit consideration of municipal systems to those which are sufficiently
developed to reveal the extent to which they share underlying principles."
Thirlway, supra note 117, at 124.
119. See BROWNLIE, supra note 90, at 16 (referring to Descamps' draft, which
did not make it into the Statute of the PCIJ: "the rules of international law recog-
nized by the legal conscience of civilized peoples.").
120. See id.
121. See Ford, supra note 115, at 66. Ford labeled these two schools of thought
"comparativist" and "categoricist" for the purposes of his article and this Note will
also use these labels.
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principles of international law. 2
The comparativist approach requires an exhaustive study
of municipal legal systems in the hopes that a general princi-
ple of law emerges."2 This study would ideally produce a
principle shared by the "major legal systems of the world" and
find "the maximum measure of agreement on the principles
relevant to the case at hand."' The comparativist approach
recognizes that a municipal principle need not be a mirror
image of itself when used in an international context:
If any real meaning is to be given to the words 'general' or
'universal' and the like, the correct test would seem to be
that an international judge before taking over a principle
from private law must satisfy himself that it is recognized in
substance by all the main systems of law, and that in apply-
ing it he will not be doing violence to the fundamental con-
cepts of any of those systems."
What followed from this approach were time-consuming com-
parative studies of municipal systems by academics, which
resulted in few results because, as it turns out, generally
shared principles by municipal systems are rare.'26 In addi-
tion to the scant body of law produced by the comparativist
approach, the possibility existed of holding a state accountable
for a law of which the state was unaware, which violates a
basic maxim and therefore,
[t]he conclusion must be that it is insufficient to point to
unanimity of municipal legal systems on a particular point
unless the rule which it is sought to derive from them pos-
sesses such a degree of reasonableness and appropriateness
122. See id. at 66.
123. See id.
124. Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses Of "General Principles" In the Development
of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 279, 284 (1963).
125. H.C. GuTrERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW 65 (H. C. Gutteridge et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1949).
. 126. See Ford, supra note 115, at 67-68. One such study was produced by Por-
tugal in the Right of Passage case where Portugal surveyed 64 municipal legal
systems to prove that since 61 of those systems recognized the right of passage
for enclaved territory, a general principle of law existed. See id.; see also Right of
Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 11-12 (Apr. 12) (Por-
tuguese final submissions). The court never reached this issue since Portugal's
argument primarily relied on general and specific practice. See Ford, supra note
115, at 68 n.120.
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for application on the international plane for a State which
acts in a contrary manner at least to have been conscious of a
possibility that a rule of law might point in the opposite di-
rection. Put another way, .. the Court will be slow to recog-
nize the existence of a general principle of law, even if there
is good evidence of unanimity of municipal legal systems, un-
less it is such that it would be likely to guide or inspire State
action."
For a principle to "possess such a degree of reasonableness
and appropriateness" the categoricist approach holds that the
principle should be inherent to the essence of the law. Its uni-
versality alone does not make the principle a general principle
of law, but the logic and reasoning of the principle transforms
it into a general principal of law. This approach does not en-
dorse a borrowing of specific rules, nor does "[t]his part of
international law.., consist... in specific rules formulated
for practical purposes, but in general propositions underlying
the various rules of law which express the essential qualities of
juridical truth itself, in short of Law."" 8 What is essential to
the categoricist approach is the process of reasoning used by a
judge in deciding which legal principles should be used.12 In
the process of reasoning, a judge should:
look for applicable principles both in public international law
and, to the extent that this does not yield an answer, in prin-
ciples extracted from recognized national systems of law ....
[T]his process might lead to the acceptance of some, and the
rejection of other, principles of even a highly developed sys-
tem of law, since almost any national system is a mixture of
modem and antiquated principles, of those of general appli-
cability and those of historic or national peculiarity.3
The categoricist approach, while having a certain logical ap-
peal, fails to protect against the subjective nature of the pro-
127. Thirlway, supra note 117, at 112-13. In the South West Africa cases in
1966, South African Judge ad hoc Van Wyk pointed out that in applying general
principles of law, "tilt certainly does not mean that by legislating on particular
domestic matters a majority of civilized nations could compel a minority to intro-
duce similar legislation." South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966
I.C.J. 6, 170 (July 18) (separate opinion of Judge Van Wyk).
128. CHENG, supra note 116, at 24.
129. See Friedmann, supra note 124, at 284.
130. Id.
948 [Vol. XXIII:3
1998] MULTINATIONALS IN HOST COUNTRIES
cess whereby a judge, without any guidelines, would be expect-
ed to discern what the "Law" is, in order to discern the princi-
ples of the "Law."
Therefore, when deciding whether a principle is in fact a
general principle of law, a judge may use municipal systems as
a guide in the assessment of whether a municipal law should
be borrowed. 3' However, the inquiry does not discontinue if
a quota is not met, the search's purpose being to answer ques-
tions of international law through the use of municipal princi-
ples. However,
[wihen having recourse to municipal law, in search of a prin-
ciple which may be sufficiently general to warrant its being
treated as 'accepted' by nations, the principle must be defined
in a pure form: the individual subjects of law between whom
it operates must be replaced, as in an algebraic equation, by
x and y. Then, in the context of international law, x and y
may be given the values 'State A' and 'State B', or 'State' and
'international organization', for example, and the congruity of
the principle assessed.'32
When relying on analogy as a way of transferring municipal
law to the international plane, ubiquity within municipal sys-
tems is not required and "it suffices to suggest that the current
problem in international law is analogous to one which arises
in the municipal sphere, and that the municipal solution is one
which recommends itself for disposing of the international law
problem."'3 '
131. See Ford, supra note 115, at 73.
132. Thirlway, supra note 117, at 118. This formula was the basis of South
Africa's argument countering the premise that a general principle of law against
discrimination existed and that South Africa had breached this law by having an
apartheid system in South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Aft.), 1966
I.C.J. 6 (July 18). As Thirlway describes, "[t]he argument of the applicants in the
South West Africa cases represented a short-circuiting of this analysis: it involved
transferring the alleged principle to the international plane with the subjects of
municipal law still in place, as it were." Thirlway, supra note 117, at 118. The
court in the South West Africa cases still found that non-discrimination was a
general principle of law, but in Thirlway's view, this basis was founded on a "wid-
er concept" of general principles of law, "containing a much more marked element
of natural law." Id.
133. Thirlway, supra note 117, at 119. In the Appeal Relating to the Jurisdic-
tion of the ICAO Council, Judge Dillard used an analogy to U.S. jurisprudence to
decide an issue dealing with a compromissory clause in a treaty. See Appeal Re-
lating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, 1972 I.C.J. 46, 109-14 (Aug. 1972)
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Therefore, when a judge is presented with a legal issue
which cannot be answered with applicable treaties, customary
law or judicial decisions, that judge must use her discretion in
reviewing municipal systems in search of a general principle of
law.'34 Depending on the legal issue, the judge may want to
see widespread consistency among municipal systems, or may
simply want to borrow a reasonable principle from a municipal
system, in order to fill a gap. In the case of finding state action
by private actors, a judge can look to international law to de-
cide this question. She cannot, however, look to international
law to determine whether that private actor, engaged in state
action, should be held liable. A judge can skirt the state action
issue by relying on the current state of international law,
which has not reached this issue, or a judge can decide this
issue by reviewing municipal systems, such as the United
States', that have been presented with this same problem.
1. State Action within International Law.
Imputing private action to the state certainly has been an
issue contemplated by international courts, tribunals and
scholars.'35 The international, statist perspective frames the
issue as whether the state should be held responsible for the
acts of private persons:
Imputability in international law is the juridical attribution
of a particular act by a physical person, or a group of physi-
cal persons, to a State, or other international person, where-
by it is regarded as the latter's own act. Imputability is a
basic notion in the concept of State responsibility and is fun-
damentally linked with the juridical concept of the State in
international law.36
A maxim of international law is that the state shall only be
responsible for the acts of its agents or for acts for which it has
assumed responsibility, conforming to the tenets of culpabili-
ty. '3 The state will only be responsible for activities of pri-
(separate opinion of Judge Dillard).
134. See generally Ford, supra note 115, at 79.
135. See generally Ian Brownlie, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS STATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY (PART I) 159-66 (1983).
136. CHENG, supra note 116, at 180-81.
137. See id. at 208.
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vate actors if the state "approves" or "ratifies" them.3 ' When
such private actors appear to be acting under the authority of
the state, the acts should be imputed to the state.'39 The In-
ternational Law Commission drafted articles and commentar-
ies regarding state responsibility between 1973 and 1975140
and extended imputability through Draft Article 8, entitled
"Attribution to the State of the conduct of persons acting in
fact on behalf of the State."' Draft Article 8 states that "the
conduct of a person or group of persons shall also be considered
as an act of State under international law if (a) it is estab-
lished that such person or group of persons was in fact acting
on behalf of that State." "Person" is used in Draft Article 8
instead of "individual" so as not to exclude associations and
private companies from the article.4 The Commentary ac-
companying Draft Article 8 does not give a litany of examples
because it claims that the principle embodied therein is "prac-
tically undisputed:""'
The attribution to the State, as a subject of international law,
of the conduct of persons who are in fact acting on its behalf,
though without thereby acquiring the status of organs either
of the State itself or of some other entity empowered to exer-
cise elements of the governmental authority, is unanimously
upheld by the writers on international law who have dealt
138. Cotesworth & Powell Case (Gr. Brit. v. Colom. 1875), 2 HISTORY AND
DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE U.S. HAs BEEN A
PARTY, Mis. Doc. No. 212, at 2050, 2082 (53d Cong., 2d Sess., 1898) (alleged
denial of justice by the courts of Colombia).
139. See Stephens Case (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 265, 267 (Gen.
Claims Comm. 1927) ("It is difficult to determine with precision the status of
these guards as an irregular auxiliary of the army, the more so as they lacked
both uniforms and insignia; but at any rate they were 'acting for' Mexico.").
140. These reports currently consist of 35 articles and commentaries which
have been consolidated in one volume. See THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
DRAFT ARTICLEs ON STATE RESPONSIBLITY, pt. 1, arts. 1-35, at vii-ix (Shabtai
Rosenne ed., 1991) [hereinafter DRAFT ARTcLEs].
141. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 8, in Report of the Commis-
sion to the General Assembly, U.N. International Law Commission, 26th Sess., ch.
III(B), U.N. Doc. A/9610/Rev.1 (1974), reprinted in [1974] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm.
157, 277, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER/A/1974/Add.1 (Part One).
142. Id.
143. See id. art. 8 cmt. 13. For purposes of consistency, this Note uses "private
actor(s)" when referring to "persons," as meant by the International Law Commis-
sion.
144. Id. art. 8 cmt. 7.
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with this question.145
When a person acts on behalf of the state, it must be estab-
lished that "persons were actually appointed by organs of the
State to discharge a particular function or to carry out a par-
ticular duty.... .14 ' Therefore, if a state authorizes the pri-
vate actor to act on behalf of the state and the burden of proof
is met, the private actor becomes a de facto state actor.
Six scenarios have been outlined where the activities of
private actors can be imputed to the state: "(a) [aidmission of
responsibility; (b) [e]xpress authorization or ratification; (c)
[a]pproval and adoption of harmful acts; (d) [b]reach of a duty
to exercise due diligence in control of private persons; (e) [a]cts
of officials outside their official competence; [and] (f) '[q]uasi-
public' legal persons."47 In a stark example of Subparagraph
(c), "approval and adoption of harmful acts" by the state, which
involved the taking of hostages in Iran in 1979,' the ICJ
held:
The policy thus announced by the Ayatollah Khomeini, of
maintaining the occupation of the Embassy and the detention
of its inmates as hostages for the purpose of exerting pres-
sure on the United States Government, was complied with by
other Iranian authorities and endorsed by them repeatedly in
statements made in various contexts. The result of that poli-
cy was fundamentally to transform the legal nature of the
situation created by the occupation of the Embassy and the
detention of its diplomatic and consular staff as hostages.
The approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini
and other organs of the Iranian State, and the decision to
perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the
Embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of that
State. The militants, authors of the invasion and jailers of
the hostages, had now become agents of the Iranian State for
whose acts the State itself was internationally responsi-
ble.149
145. Id.
146. Id. art. 8 cmt. 8.
147. See BROWNUIE, supra note 135, at 160-63.
148. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
149. Id. para. 74, at 36. Khomeini was found to have approved of the acts by
the militants who took over the U.S. Embassy because of his decree that stated,
in part, that the U.S. Embassy was "a centre of espionage and conspiracy" and
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There were no findings that the Iranian government and the
militants had officially colluded prior to the seizure of the
embassy, or that the militants "had any form of official status
as recognized 'agents' or organs of the Iranian State."5 ' Nev-
ertheless, based on the endorsement by the Iranian govern-
ment of the acts of the militants, the entire takeover of the
embassy was imputed to the Iranian government, as a viola-
tion of international law.
151
International law, therefore, has a long history of holding
a state responsible for the activities of private actors, as long
as the activities are in violation of international law. However,
international law goes only so far: the state is responsible for
the private action, but the private actor is not held accountable
for its own unlawful act under international law. Interestingly,
international organizations, such as the United Nations, do
hold themselves accountable for internationally wrongful acts,
albeit voluntarily.'52 Although these wrongful acts cannot be
imputed to the state in which the acts occurred, the interna-
tional organization can be found to be legally liable.'53 For in-
stance, when the United Nations sent a force to the Congo in
the early 1960s, complaints were lodged against the organiza-
tion for damages caused by its personnel. 54 While the United
Nations had voluntarily agreed to pay a lump-sum settlement
to the harmed nationals, the Secretary-General stressed the
importance of facing its responsibility "for which the Organiza-
tion was legally liable."'55 However, international law has
been resistant to setting up rules for determining an interna-
that "'those people who hatched plots against our Islamic movement in that place
do not enjoy international diplomatic respect.'" Id. para. 73, at 34.
150. Id. para. 58, at 30.
151. See id. para. 76, at 36. The ICJ found that the Iranian government vio-
lated international law by breaching provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplo-
matic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. See id.
152. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 13 cmt. 3, Report of the
Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. International Law Commission, ch.
II(B), U.N. Doc. A/10O0/Rev.1 [hereinafter 1975 Report], reprinted in 1975 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 47, 87-88, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1975/Add.1.
153. See id. art. 13 cmt. 4.
154. See id. art 13 cmts. 3-4. Nationals from Belgium, Greece, Italy, Luxem-
bourg and Switzerland, situated in the Congo during the time of the operations of
the U.N., suffered damages to their person and property. See id. art. 13 cmt. 3.
155. Letter from Secretary General of the United Nations to the Acting Repre-
sentative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Aug. 6, 1965), reprinted in
1965 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 41, U.N. Doc. ST/LEGISER.C/3.
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tional organization's liability.'56
Thus, as it stands now, international law has not endorsed
the principle that a private actor, when acting under color of
law, is legally responsible for its acts that are in violation of
international laws, even though the state giving the authority
is responsible for those acts. By finding private actors liable for
their wrongful acts, a judge would be expanding international
law's reach. 5 ' Since the current state of international law
does not embrace this principle, a judge deciding this issue
must either avoid the question of whether international law
should reach private actors altogether,'58 or, if choosing not
to pass on this issue, look to general principles of law to deter-
mine whether state action doctrine within international law
should be extended to private actors.
2. Private Persons acting under color of state law: U.S.
Jurisprudence
The import of Section 1983 jurisprudence for the purposes
of international law is the principle that a private actor can be
held accountable for activities that are characterized as state
action.'59 The tests used under Section 1983 to find a private
156. See 1975 Report supra note 152, art. 13 cmt. 8. The Commission declined
to create any rules regarding the international responsibility of international orga-
nizations because such a task was beyond the scope of the draft. See id. The Com-
mission believed it was not required to: "establish how an international organiza-
tion may become a subject of international law distinct from its constituent States;
to indicate when the responsibility of the international organization or its member
States may be incurred, or in what cases there may be joint, concurrent or alter-
native responsibility . . . ." Id.
157. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (Revised) § 101 (1986) ('International law' . . .deals with the conduct of
states and of international organizations, and with their relations inter se, as well
as some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.").
158. In choosing to pass on this issue, a U.S. court can rely on the Supreme
Court's decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, which held that U.S.
courts should not decide issues that have not been clearly defined within interna-
tional law. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
This defense in an ATCA case is a formidable one but not insurmountable. Gener-
al principles of law are a source of international law. Municipal law can be sub-
sumed within this source and applied in an international law context. If a private
actor is found to be engaged in state action, finding liability on the part of the
private actor, under U.S. municipal law, is very clearly defined: liability may be
imposed.
159. See generally Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). In Adickes, the
Court held that a private store that refused to serve a white woman because she
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actor liable are not relevant for the purposes of international
law because within international law, a body of law for assess-
ing the existence of state action already exists.60 The general
principle of law that should be extracted from Section 1983 is
simply that the private actor, along with the state actor,
should be held accountable for its unlawful acts. If a petitioner
in a Section 1983 claim can prove that his civil rights have
been violated by either a state official or a private party acting
under color of law, then relief will be granted, with a judgment
against the private actor.'' This principle is important not
only for its purpose of holding persons accountable for their
acts, but also because objectionable activity by private actors
can be controlled by the federal judiciary.'62 Even though Sec-
tion 1983 was enacted with an express limitation exempting
non-state activity, private actors are not completely out of the
reach of Section 1983.
3. General principle of law: Private actors acting under color
of state law are liable.
As a general principle of law, private actors should be held
accountable for their activities when acting under color of law.
This principle can be borrowed from the U.S. municipal legal
system by international law because the principle is analogous
in both systems and can be successfully transferred from the
municipal context to the international.'63 In the municipal
setting, a private actor cannot be touched by 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for activities that, if committed by a state actor, would fall
within the law.'4 However, if the private actor is found to be
was in "the company of Negro students" violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by conspiring
with the local police to deprive the woman of her civil rights. See id. at 149. The
woman and six African American students, after being denied access to a public
library, went to the store to eat. See id. A police officer entered the restaurant at
the time the woman and her students were seated at a booth. See id. A waitress
then took the orders of the students, but refused to serve Ms. Adickes, causing
the woman and the students to leave. After leaving the restaurant, the woman
was arrested by the same police officer who had been in the store on groundless
charges of vagrancy. See id
160. See supra Part III.D.1.
161. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 150-52.
162. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmERIcAN CONSTrrUIONAL LAW 1689 (2d ed.
1988).
163. See generally supra Part III.D.1.
164. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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acting under color of law, then both it, a de facto state actor
and the state may be held liable under Section 1983. In the
international context, under certain substantive international
law, such as that of torture or death, private actors cannot be
touched by the applicable international law for activities that,
if committed by a state actor, would fall within the law.165 If,
however, the private actor is found to be acting under color of
law, only the state can be held liable, even though its liability
is established because of the activity of the private actor, a de
facto state actor. The algebraic formula loosely referred to by
Thirlway in the context of the South West Africa cases'66 is
satisfied where, in both the municipal setting and the interna-
tional setting, x represents the de facto state actor and y repre-
sents the state.'67 The similarity between the municipal and
international law is tantamount to an analogy and, therefore,
it is appropriate to look to municipal law for guidance. 68
Under international law, when a judge is confronted with
a private actor who has been accused of acting under color of
law in violation of international law, the judge first will review
the substantive law to determine whether the private actor can
be held accountable.'69 If the judge determines that the sub-
stantive law does not hold private actors liable, then the pri-
vate actor is immune, even though the state, which either
authorized or adopted the activities, is not. The state is held
liable because it has breached an international obligation by
sanctioning the acts of the private actor; the liability of the
state is wholly contingent upon its endorsement of the activi-
ties of the private actor. The private actor does not have an
obligation to the international community as a private actor,
but it does have an obligation as a state actor. Otherwise, the
state could not be found liable based on the private actor's
activities. The state co-opts the private actor for state purposes
165. See Kadic v. Karadid, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1996).
166. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Aft.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July
18).
167. See Thirlway, supra note 117, at 118 (analyzing the South West Africa
Cases).
168. In the South West Africa cases, the litigants argued that the general prin-
ciple of law against discrimination, once found, should be applied to those same
litigants rather than transplanting the general principle of law into an internation-
al context. See id.
169. See supra Part III.C.
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and all activities incurred during the period of co-option are
characterized as state action. If the state is held accountable
for a private actor's activities because an actor is deemed a de
facto state actor, then it should be treated as such. The fact
that it is not a de jure state actor has no bearing on the state's
liability; it is irrelevant. The distinction between de jure state
actors and de facto state actors is only relevant when the pri-
vate actor is called upon to fulfill its obligation to the interna-
tional community. By providing immunity for this de facto
state actor, international law ignores the fact that an interna-
tional obligation by the state has been breached. 7 ° Complete
responsibility for this breach is not taken by the state as long
as the de facto state actor is not held accountable.
The importance of acknowledging private actor liability is
particularly relevant in cases where MNCs are intimately
involved with a host state's deprivation of human rights. By
holding an MNC in a host country accountable for its state
action, international law will frustrate the immunity enjoyed
by both MNCs and host countries.' 7 ' An example of an MNC
allegedly colluding with a host country in the deprivation of
human rights is Shell Oil in Nigeria. This case study shows
why a general principle of law should hold de facto state actors
liable for their international obligations.
170. The main defense against applying this general principle of law to private
actors is that they had no reason to know that such an obligation existed and,
therefore, holding them accountable is in violation of another general principle of
law-"no one may be condemned for breach of a law which he neither knew of nor
could know of." Thirlway, supra note 117, at 112. However, private actors know or
should know that the state is liable for wrongful acts and that state actors de
jure are held accountable. The fact that a private actor has committed a wrongful
act that creates liability on the part of the state does not show ignorance on the
part of the private actor that it is committing a wrongful act.
171. Host countries generally are protected from ATCA claims because of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which precludes suits brought against foreign
states unless the claims involve commercial activity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994).
Except for the ATCA and the legal apparatus of the host country, an MNC is safe
from any legal repercussions for its illegal activity. Generally speaking, if a host
country is colluding with an MNC in violating human rights, it will be doubtful
that the host country will bring charges against the MNC.
957
BROOK. J. INTL L.
IV. MNCs As STATE ACTORS
A. Shell Oil in Nigeria
Shell Oil, an MNC located in Nigeria, has been accused of
violating international human rights law in a number of
ways-(1) summary execution; (2) crimes against humanity; (3)
torture; (4) cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment; and (5)
arbitrary arrest and detention-and has been sued by the
family members of two victims of the alleged human rights
violations.'72 Shell Oil is not accountable for these acts in any
international forum and the Nigerian government has no inter-
est in charging Shell Oil with crimes for which it too could be
held accountable. A brief history of the recent events in Nige-
ria elucidates the flaw inherent in international law for failing
to hold private actors responsible for their activities.
As a result of a civil war in Nigeria during the 1960s and
a subsequent political vacuum, the Northern elite 73 and
Shell Oil were able to move into Nigeria and establish what is
now one of the largest oil companies in the world. 74 The Ni-
gerian government was instrumental in Shell Oil's business
venture in this region, which resulted in Shell Nigeria, a joint
venture between Shell Oil and the state-owned Nigerian Na-
tional Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter NNPC).'76 Each
successor government has profited from this business relation-
ship. Today, Shell Oil pumps approximately one-half of
Nigeria's nearly two million barrels per day of crude oil, ac-
counting for about ninety percent of the country's foreign ex-
change. 7 ' The Nigerian government owns fifty-five percent of
172. A suit has been filed against Shell Oil in the Southern District of New
York. See Plaintiffs Demand For Jury Trial, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
No. 96 Civ. 8386 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1996). The plaintiffs chose only to sue Shell
Oil and not the Nigerian government. As of January 27, 1997, Shell Oil has not
responded to the complaint.
173. The North and the South are divided by religion-the North is predom-
inantly Muslim and the South is predominantly Christian. When the English left
in 1960, they handed power over to a minority in the North who are referred to
by some as the Northern elite. See Hilary Andersson, 2 Branches of Islam Clash-
ing in Nigeria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1996, at A9.
174. See Paul Lewis, After Nigeria Represses, Shell Defends Its Record, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 1996, at Al.
175. See Wil Haygood; Nigeria On Trial: Writer's Hanging Latest Disaster To
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the corporation.' Shell Oil pumps 900,000 barrels of oil a
day, keeping 257,000 for itself and giving the rest to its part-
ner, the Nigerian government.'78  From this production,
Shell's profits total $170 million to $190 million a year.'79
Shell Oil first discovered oil in the southeastern region of
Nigeria, Ogoni, in 1958.180 When Shell Oil moved into Ogoni,
environmental changes in this region began.'8 ' Shell Oil did
not comply, nor was it required to comply, with environmental
standards required in other countries, such as the United
States or England.'82 Due to environmental problems, people
in the region began to challenge the oil companies and the
Nigerian government's environmental policies. 8 ' In October
1990, in Umuechem,' protestors organized peaceful demon-
strations'85 against Shell's environmental destruction. 88 As
a result, Shell wrote the Rivers State Police Commissioner
requesting protection by the Mobil Police Force against an
"impending attack" on company facilities.8 7 The police re-
sponded to Shell Oil's request the next day by killing the lead-
er of the protest, along with eighty others, and by partially or
totally destroying 495 houses.'88
As a result of this violent response to the protestors and
the ongoing environmental destruction to the region, Ogoni
village chiefs created and organized the Movement of the Sur-
vival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP).8 9 MOSOP presented the
177. See id.
178. See Lewis, supra note 174, at A6.
179. See id. Nick Antill, an analyst with the London securities house Barclays
de Zoete Wedd, quotes these profits and concludes that these profits constitute
"nearly 10 percent of total exploration and production profits, which is signifi-
cant.'" Id.
180. See Andy Rowell, Shell Shocked, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 21, 1995, at 21.
181. See id. Ogoni people suffered from a disproportionate amount of respirato-
ry problems and obscure diseases. See id.; but see Lewis, supra note 174, at Al
(claiming that the environmental complaints of the devastation of Ogoni are exag-
gerated).
182. See Lewis, supra note 174, at A10.
183. See Rowell, supra note 180, at 21.
184. A southeastern village in Ogoniland.
185. The demonstrations took place at Shell sites. Peter Takirambudde, Letter
to Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1996, at 22. Takirambudde is the Executive Direc-
tor of Human Rights Watch/Africa. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Rowell, supra note 180, at 22.
188. See id.
189. See KEN SARO-WIWA, A MONTH AND A DAY: A DETENTION DIARY 66, 78
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Ogoni Bill of Rights to the Nigerian government in 1990 citing
environmental destruction and demanding economic compensa-
tion and political autonomy.' MOSOP emphasized that it
was not a secessionist organization. 9' Ken Saro-Wiwa, the
first appointed speaker, brought recognition to Ogoniland by
publishing essays on the environmental damage in Ogoniland
and its effect on the people of the region. 92 Saro-Wiwa also
challenged the way Shell Oil and the Nigerian government did
business and confronted the government for its alleged cor-
ruption in siphoning off profits and in its refusal to give com-
pensation back to the community. MOSOP protested the
presence of Shell by demonstrating at oil pumps and by de-
manding that Shell Oil be consistent in its environmental
standards followed in western locations.'94 As a result, in Au-
gust 1993, Shell Oil again requested the assistance of the Mo-
bil Police Force (locally known as "the go and kill mob"),'95
which led an attack resulting in the deaths of thirty-five
Ogoni.9 6 When the Ogoni continued to demonstrate against
Shell Oil's presence, Shell Oil called the military police who
arrived near the area of Korokoro, in Ogoni, in vehicles sup-
(1995).
190. See id. at 67-70.
191. See M.C. van Walt van Praag, Letter to Editor, Feb. 17, 1996, N.Y. TImES,
at 22. Van Praag was the General Secretary of the Unrepresented Nations and
Peoples Organization, of which MOSOP was a member. See id; but see Lewis,
supra note 174, at A10 (claiming that Saro-Wiwa's true goals were autonomy and
a share of the oil revenue and that the environmental claims were trumped up to
get attention from the West). Also, the Nigerian government argues that MOSOP
resembled secessionists during the Biafran war and feared that the Ogoni were
moving toward a separatist war. See id. The government justifies its response to
the Ogoni as putting down an insurgency before it got started. See id
192. See SARO-WIWA, supra note 189, at 66; see also Lewis, supra note 174, at
Al. Saro-Wiwa supported a "younger" contingency of Ogoni protestors whose posi-
tion against ShelJ and the Nigerian government was more adamant than that of
the traditional leaders. See SARO-WIWA, supra note 189, at 102. This younger
contingency was later accused of supporting violent tactics, allegedly resulting in
the final act of violence, the murder of the four Ogoni leaders. See Lewis, supra
note 174, at A10.
193. See SARO-WlWA, supra note 189, at 131. By challenging the corruption,
Saro-Wiwa set himself apart from the older MOSOP leaders who did not question
the Nigerian government in this manner. See id. at 177-78.
194. See id. at 166.
195. See Lewis, supra note 174, at A10.
196. See Rowell, supra note 180, at 21; Plaintiffs Demand For Jury Trial,
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386, para. 51; at 10 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 8, 1996).
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plied by Shell Oil.' 9' As a result of these incidents, the Inter-
nal Security Force of the Nigerian government responded to
Shell's request by issuing a memo dated December 5, 1993,
stating: "Shell operations still impossible unless ruthless mili-
tary operations are undertaken... wasting targets cutting
across communities and leadership cadres, especially vocal
individuals."9 ' Shell operations could not continue unless the
Ogoni region was "pacified."'99 Within this memo, a notation
requiring the financial assistance on the part of Shell was
included.2"0
The following April, the Internal Security Force attacked
eight Ogoni villages and burned down two villages, Leader and
Tumbe.2"' Shell paid for the transportation of the police force
into these Ogoni villages and underwrote bonus salaries to
some of the military police who committed human rights viola-
tions. °2 During the attacks, witnesses claimed that Shell
helicopters were flying over the villages and that Shell boats
were used to transport the police force.0 ' Saro-Wiwa's broth-
er, Dr. Owens Wiwa, also testified at a hearing to an incident
he witnessed: while he was driving, he saw a man, lying on the
ground in a pool of blood, who claimed that he had been shot
by a military police officer accompanied by a Shell representa-
tive.2 0
4
On May 21, 1994, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others were
197. See Plaintiffs Demand For Jury Trial para. 53, at 10, Wiwa (No. 96 Civ
8386). It has been alleged that the military police shot a seventy-five-year-old man
and two youths, during this incursion into Korokoro. See id. para 54.
198. Derrick Z. Jackson, A Shell Game In Nigeria, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File. To whom this memo was
issued is unclear and, more important, it is unclear whether Shell Oil and the
Nigerian government agreed on the contents of the memo before or after it was is-
sued.
199. WOLE SOYINKA, THE OPEN SORE OF A CONTINENT 35 (1996).
200. See Lewis, supra note 174, at A10.
201. See Plaintiffs Demand For Jury Trial para. 55, at 10, Wiwa (No. 96 Civ
8386). The number of people killed during these attacks has not been established,
though some reports claim the death toll was in the thousands. See Rowell, supra
note 180, at 22.
202. See Lewis, supra note 174, at Al; see also Rowell, supra note 180, at 21.
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204. See Greenpeace, Transcript of 'A Testimony' By Dr. Owens Wiwa (Brother
of Ken Saro-Wiwa) (visited Jan. 18, 1998)
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arrested and jailed without being charged with a crime."'
The arrest was allegedly for ordering the murders of four
Ogoni leaders2 0 --Albert Badey, Edward Kobani, Samuel
Orage and Theophilus Orage-who had disagreed with Saro-
Wiwa's leadership of MOSOP. The government claimed that,
based on this infighting, Saro-Wiwa had ordered the mur-
ders. 2 7 While Saro-Wiwa was in prison, his brother, Dr.
Owens Wiwa, spoke with the head of Shell Oil, Brian Ander-
son, in an attempt to broker a release by clemency.0 When
he told Anderson that Saro-Wiwa's health was failing and that
he needed medical attention, Saro-Wiwa was moved to a mili-
tary hospital and received medical attention for the first time
after being detained for approximately eleven months. 211 Sus-
pecting that he could receive assistance from Anderson, Dr.
Wiwa then asked Anderson if he could influence the govern-
ment in giving Saro-Wiwa clemency. 20 Anderson replied that
if Dr. Wiwa and Saro-Wiwa called off the campaign to discredit
Shell Oil, Anderson would see what he could do.21' Dr. Wiwa
said he did not have the power to call off the campaign and,
even if he did, he could not in good conscience choose between
his brother and the Ogoni people.212 Anderson denies the sub-
stance of these conversations, even though he does admit to
having a conversation with Dr. Wiwa."'
The government defends its trial of Saro-Wiwa, arguing
that Saro-Wiwa was tried in public, with representation, first
by his own attorney and then by a court-appointed attor-
ney.214 Saro-Wiwa's lawyer, Gani Fawehimni, resigned be-
cause he felt the trial was unfair.21 '5 He complained that be-
cause Saro-Wiwa was held at a military barracks, Fawehimni
could not speak with Saro-Wiwa privately and could only
205. See Nigeria's Waiting Game, N.Y. TIMS, May 6, 1996, at A14.
206. See id.
207. See Lewis, supra note 174, at A6.





213. See Rowell, supra note 180, at 22.
214. See C.O. Awani, Sanctions on Nigeria Would Deepen Poverty, Letter to
Editor, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1996, at A18. Saro-Wiwa did not accept the court-ap-
pointed attorney. See id.
215. See Haygood, supra note 175.
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strategize publicly in the courthouse. 16 These complaints re-
sulted in Fawehimni being arrested, tortured and held in jail
on no charges, which is where he remains today.21 Based on
the bribery of two key prosecution witnesses, Saro-Wiwa and
eight others were condemned to death on October 30 and 31 by
a military-appointed special tribunal and, on November 10,
1995, Saro-Wiwa was hanged."8 In February of 1996, Shell
Oil admitted that it had purchased "sidearms" and "handguns,"
to protect Shell's facilities, on behalf of the Nigerian Police
Force, which did not have sufficient funds to purchase these
weapons. 9 Shell Oil defends this practice by claiming that
other companies in Nigeria buy the police its guns in order to
protect their facilities.2
B. Shell Oil as de facto state actor under general principles of
law
Shell Oil participated in the violation of human rights in
Nigeria by conspiring with the Nigerian government when it
economically and politically supported the attacks on the Ogoni
villages and, when it bribed witnesses for the prosecution in
the trial of Saro-Wiwa.22" ' By actively being involved in the
internal politics of Nigeria, by paying for the miliary opera-
tions in Ogoni and by providing the weapons and vehicles used
in the violation of human rights, Shell Oil accepted a state
function. By accepting this role, Shell Oil functioned as a state
actor. The Nigerian government looked to Shell Oil as a part-
ner in handling the problems that arose at the Shell facilities
and turned over some of the responsibility to Shell Oil. By re-
questing payments, weapons and vehicles for the explicit pur-
216. See id.
217. See id.; Plaintiffs Demand For Jury Trial para. 66, at 12, Wiwa v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1996). The complaint
against Shell Oil alleges that Saro-Wiwa's seventy-four-year-old mother was beaten,
along with other family members, when attending Saro-Wiwa's trial. See id.
218. See Haygood, supra note 175.
219. See Matthew Yeomans, Oil, Guns and Lies, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 20, 1996,
at 26.
220. See id.
221. Clearly, these allegations must be proven, but the facts as they are pre-
sented thus far form an argument that Shell Oil was in fact a violator of human
rights. Because these allegations have not been proven in a court of law, they are,
as of now, just allegations.
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pose of violating human rights, the Nigerian government
viewed Shell Oil as a de facto state actor. These two actors
conspired as equals to deny the rights of Ogoni people. Howev-
er, only one of these actors can be held liable for these acts.
Shell Oil does not face any repercussions for its activities in
Nigeria, even though these activities violate international law.
As a de facto state actor, Shell Oil's liability is imputed to the
state, but it still has an obligation not to violate human rights.
Maintaining a distinction between the state de jure and de
facto state actors protects illegal activity. If Shell Oil was not
found to be a de facto state actor and it remained a private
actor, then international law, as it stands today, could not
touch it. However, Shell Oil was acting in the capacity of the
state and it, therefore, should be treated as such.
V. CONCLUSION
If de facto state actors are found liable under international
law, a step will be made in restructuring the current statist
system. The benefit in restructuring this paradigm is that
MNCs are quickly amassing enormous amounts of power in the
global economy: "[With the exception of a handful of nation-
states, multinationals are alone in possessing the size, technol-
ogy, and economic reach necessary to influence human affairs
on a global basis."22 However, based on free trade economic
policies, the international community has no interest in regu-
lating MNCs. One consequence in failing to regulate MNCs is
that nation-states are effectively turning over global power to
entities that are above the law. This prospect, needless to say,
should be avoided. While the ATCA will not completely convert
the role of the MNC in the global community, it could alter the
manner in which international law chooses to handle MNCs.
By holding an MNC liable for its activities based on interna-
tional law, the international community can adjust to this
necessary form of regulation and possibly recognize the impor-
tance of maintaining control over a potentially lawless entity.
Ariadne K. Sacharoff
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